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Gender inequality in educational attainment and labor market outcomes remains a salient feature of 
contemporary Japanese society.  In this paper, I argue that this gender gap is due in part to differences 
in how parents allocate resources within the household, more specifically according to the gender of 
their children.  I develop a model where parents maximize utility with respect to their choice between 
the quantity and quality of children.  My empirical findings support the position that intra-household 
resources are likely to be allocated in favor of sons and away from daughters in Japan. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  Gender inequality in educational attainment remains a salient feature of 
contemporary Japanese society.  This inequality exists not at the high school level 
but at the university level.  Since 1975, the advancement rate to high school has 
exceeded ninety percent for both men and women (Figure I).  However, 
advancement to four-year universities (hereafter universities) tells another story.  
Despite the overall expansion in university education in the postwar period, a 




  This paper begins by examining some of the causal forces behind the 
gender inequality in educational attainment in Japan.  Emphasis is placed on the 
social-institutional environment in which women advance through their life-cycle, in 
particular, the process by which their educational aspirations are downgraded.  This 
downward adjustment in educational aspirations is transferred across generations as 
mothers come to hold lower educational aspirations for their daughters.  In a family 
environment where parents aspire to university education more for their sons than 
for their daughters, intra-household resources will be allocated in favor of their sons.   
This pattern of differential resource allocation is likely to be most 
pronounced in the decision to advance to university, because university education is 2 
 
a sizable investment of both time and money:  at least four years of direct costs such 
as tuition and living expenses, as well as the corresponding indirect costs of 
foregone earnings.
1   
A notable feature that distinguishes university investment behavior in Japan 
from that in other Western countries is the extent to which parents finance children’s 
education.  As Nakata and Mosk (1986) explain, “Japanese parents pay about 80 
percent of their children’s (direct and indirect) educational expenses..., a proportion 
that is undoubtedly higher than in most industrial countries.” 
2  This investment 
behavior suggests that a majority of university-bound children and their parents both 
implicitly assume that university education will be financed by the parents.  Parental 
willingness to support university education for their children plays a critical role in 
Japan, much more so in comparison to her Western counterparts.
3 
The analytical section of this paper first examines the general relationship 
between sibship size and university advancement following the economics of the 
family literature and the quantity-quality tradeoff of children (Becker, 1973).  While 
a larger number of siblings reduces the quantity of household resources per child 
and consequently the probability that a child will advance to university, I argue that 
the intra-household allocation of resources is a more complex process involving the 
gender composition of siblings.  I extend my analysis to account for the number of 
brothers and sisters in the household, and examine the ways in which this gender 
composition influences university advancement differently for men and women. 
 3 
 
2.  BACKGROUND 
Why are women so underrepresented in Japanese university education?  I 
provide three explanations.  First, based on pure economic intuition, the rate of 
return from women’s university education may be lower than men’s, thereby 
depressing women’s monetary incentives to pursue university education.  Parents, 
being the sponsors (or investors) of children’s education, may therefore perceive that 
a university education will be a better investment for their sons than for their 
daughters, because they can expect higher returns by doing so.  However, this 
argument alone lacks conviction.  Government statistics have shown that the rate of 
return to university education in Japan is actually higher for women than for men 
(Ministry of Labor, 2000; OECD, 1998).
4 
A second possible explanation is that the discrepancy in educational 
attainment between men and women reflects differences in the demand for skills in 
the sex-segregated labor market in Japan.  Men are more likely to be placed into the 
internal labor market where they receive considerable on-the-job training and where 
earnings are determined heavily by seniority.  Although women’s labor force 
participation in Japan now surpasses fifty percent – a proportion comparable to 
Western counterparts – a majority of these women are relegated to the secondary (or 
external) labor market and are confined to job assignments which require little skill 
and training (Saso, 1990).  Because employers fear that women will leave the labor 
force when they marry and the returns from investments made in the women’s 
training will be lost, many employers avoid hiring women into the ‘permanent 4 
 
employment’ positions, placing them instead into the ‘short-term’ secondary labor 
market.  In order to minimize costs, employers recruit high school and junior college 
graduates instead because they can be hired at lower salaries than university 
graduates.  This pattern of differential recruitment results in a weaker demand for 
female (versus male) university graduates.   Moreover, by virtue of their placement 
into the external labor market, female workers are more susceptible to business 
cycle fluctuations, and are viewed as “buffers” in the Japanese economy (Houseman 
and Abraham, 1993). 
The gender gap in labor demand is illustrated in Figure II, which shows that 
the job-opening ratio (= number of job openings divided by the number of 
applicants) for female university graduates has been consistently weaker than for 




  And third, from the supply-side perspective, women’s aspiration to pursue 
university education may be downgraded because such ‘over-education’ may 
actually constrain their opportunities for job placement and marriage.  In an analysis 
of educational credentials among married couples in Japan, Hamana (1993) finds 
that men were more likely to marry women with lower educational credentials 
relative to themselves.  Similarly, Iwao (1993) and others have documented the 
process in which Japanese parents try to downgrade their daughters’ university 5 
 
aspirations by explaining that “a woman who is too smart can’t find a husband.”  
Hence, highly-educated women may be perceived as a threat to the status quo of the 
Japanese patriarchy, which has traditionally upheld the role of a woman as ‘good 
wife and wise mother’ (Smith, 1987).
5  From the women’s perspective, this social 
convention suggests that higher educational credentials may limit their prospects of 




  The weak incentive for women to pursue a university degree leads to their 
lower educational attainment.  Consequently, they are assigned to dead-end jobs 
outside of the internal labor market.  This supply and demand dynamic (Figure III) 
is but a vicious cycle for women, who maintain lower educational aspirations, not 
only for themselves but for their daughters.  As Brinton (1989) explains, Japanese 
women feel that “education for a daughter was well and good to a point; once that 
point was reached, education didn’t help and could actually hurt a young woman’s 




  The discrepancy between mothers’ aspirations for university education for 
their sons and daughters is a striking feature of contemporary Japanese society 6 
 
(Table I).  While in other countries this difference amounts to only a few percentage 
points, in Japan the gap is a remarkable 45.3 percent.  Put in terms of ratios, 2.6 
times as many parents aspire to university education for their sons than for 
daughters.
6 
  The downgrading in parents’ educational aspirations for their daughters is 
the critical link that determines how resources are allocated within the household.  
Given the household’s budget constraint, the quantity of resources allocated per 
child will be smaller among families with a larger number of children.  But if 
parental preferences are determined by the children’s gender, then the gender 
composition of the children will likewise determine how and how much parents 
invest in their children. 
  In sum, the gender gap in the university advancement rate in Japan reflects 
not only demand-side forces that lead to lower incentives for women to pursue 
university education, but also the social-institutional context in which women’s 
educational aspirations are shaped throughout their life course.  Crucial to this 
process is the role of parents’ educational aspirations for their children.  The next 
section analyzes the ways in which differential preferences with respect to children 
affect the probability that a son or a daughter will advance to university. 
 
3.  ANALYSIS 
  In the economics of the family tradition, the allocation of family resources 
is viewed as parents’ investment in children’s human capital.  If family resources are 7 
 
fixed, then the quantity of resources allocated per child will be a decreasing function 
of the number of children in the household, ceteris paribus.  There is hence a 
tradeoff between the quantity of children and the quality per child.   
  The underlying assumption among many previous studies is that parents 
allocate resources equally amongst their children:  In an n-children household, the 
amount of resources allocated per child will be 1/n.  In reality, characteristics such 
as birth order, birth interval (time duration between siblings) and gender may 
influence parents’ investment decisions for their children (Blake, 1989; Butcher and 
Case, 1994; Garg and Mordoch, 1998; Guo and VanWey, 1999; Watkins, 1992).  
Human capital theory would predict that earnings inequality between the sexes can 
be explained in part by the differential sex-specific, intra-family allocation of 
resources devoted to children (Rosenzweig, 1982).   
  Empirically, gender composition among siblings has been found to be an 
important determinant of family resource allocation in Asia (Chen et al., 1981; 
Davies and Zhang, 1995; Levine, 1987; Parish and Willis, 1993).  Relative to 
Western countries, traditional values of patriarchy may persist more strongly among 
Asian countries leading to unfavorable consequences for women.  Parish and Willis 
explain that, “a less happy result of (patrilineal) environments can be that daughters 
become the siblings from whom resources are drained” (p. 869). 
  In essence, allocation of family resources resembles a competitive market 
between sons and daughters.  If parents aspire to university education more for their 
sons, then family resources will likewise be allocated in favor of sons.  Taking this 8 
 
as the starting point, we argue that the gender composition of siblings may affect an 
individual’s probability of entering university.  For example, the probability of a 
woman entering university may be altered if the other siblings are all brothers, all 
sisters, or some other combination of brothers and sisters. 
 
The Model 
  We start with a model in which parent’s utility is expressed as a function of 
sons (s) and daughters (d), and their respective investments in quality (qs and qd), 
where we assume that a higher level of quality corresponds to a higher probability of 
advancing to university.  Total quality invested in sons and daughters is expressed in 
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where α and β are the parent’s preferences for allocating resources towards sons and 
daughters.
7  Parents can maximize their utility with respect to the quantity or quality 
of children.  Parents can choose the number of children they wish to have, but they 
cannot control the sex ratio of their children.
8  Following Davies and Zhang (1995), 
we assume that on average, the sex ratio equalizes to one, and that the number of 
sons and daughters is taken to be a continuous variable. 
  Parents maximize their utility subject to the following budget constraint: 9 
 
 
  Z p d q p s q p I z d d s s + + =  (2) 
 
where ps and pd are the corresponding unit prices for qs and qd, and pz is the unit 
price of parent’s own consumption (Z)
9.  For simplicity, we assume that the unit 
price of quality equals one and is the same for sons and daughters (ps = pd = 1), so 
equation (2) reduces to: 
 
  Z p d q s q I z d s + + =  (2’) 
 
  Hence the household budget is determined not by differences in the unit 
price of quality, but in the total amount of quality invested in sons and daughters.  
Because Z is not part of the parent’s utility, we assume here that resources to be 
allocated for children are fixed and independent of the number of children in the 
household.  One interpretation is that parents first allocate the household budget for 
their own consumption, then invest what is left of the budget (I − pzZ) for their 
children (or vice versa).  In essence, sons and daughters must “compete against each 
other” to gain their share of what’s left of the household budget.  
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The π’s are the marginal costs (or shadow prices) with respect to quality, and are 
positively correlated to the number of sons and daughters; an increase in quality is 
more expensive the greater the number of sons and daughters because this increase 
must be applied to more units.  On the other hand, marginal costs with respect to 
quantity of children (πs and πd) are positively correlated to the level of quality 
invested in them; an increase in the number of children is more expensive if the 
children are of higher quality because they cost (or consume) more.   

















=  (4b) 
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where again we observe the quantity-quality tradeoff:  Holding income (I) fixed, an 
increase in sons and daughters leads to lower quality per child.  If parental 
preferences for sons and daughters are perfectly equal (if α = β), then qs = qd and 
sons and daughters are perfectly substitutable. 
  From equations (3a) to (3d), we obtain the following marginal rates of 
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  Both equations share similar properties and implications.  MRSqs,qd is the 
MRS with respect to the quality of sons and daughters holding quantity (or the 
number of sons and daughters) constant.  Given that the sex ratio equalizes to one 
(s/d = 1), and that the unit prices of quality are the same for sons and daughters, 
MRSqs,qd will always be equal to unity:  The marginal cost of an additional son versus 
an additional daughter changes at the same rate (πqs/πqd = 1).   
  MRSs,d is the MRS with respect to the quantity of sons and daughters 
holding their quality constant.  In contrast to MRSqs,qd which equals one, MRSs,d 
depends on the ratio qs/qd.  If parents aspire to university education more for their 
sons than daughters, and if this discrepancy translates directly into different levels of 12 
 
investments in their children’s education, then we would expect a higher level of 
quality among sons than daughters (qs > qd) which consequently corresponds to a 
higher probability of university advancement for sons.  
 The  condition  qs > qd in equations (5a) and (5b) necessarily implies that α > 
β (given s/d = 1), i.e. parents prefer to invest more for their sons than for their 
daughters, in which case MRSs,d will be greater than unity.  On the other hand, if 
parents invest equally in their sons and daughters, then qs = qd and MRSs,d will be 
equal to unity, meaning that sons and daughters are perfectly substitutable.  
Therefore, in the empirical analysis, the condition MRSs,d = 1 is our null hypothesis.  
If qs is significantly greater than qd, then MRSs,d > 1:  Given the same level of quality, 
parents prefer to invest (or consume) more in their sons than in their daughters.
12 
 
Data and Variables 
  The data come from the Social Stratification and Mobility Survey (hereafter 
SSM) conducted in 1995.
13  The SSM consists of men and women between the ages 
of 20 and 69 residing in Japan in 1995 and includes detailed information on 
respondents’ educational history and social background.  We exclude single-child 
households because our primary interest is to examine the effect of additional 
siblings.   The dependent variable is whether the individual advanced to university 
or not.  Table II shows the means and standard deviations of the variables to be used 
in the analysis.  The total sample size after controlling for missing values is 2,208. 
  We are interested in examining the extent to which parents allocate 13 
 
household resources differently for sons and daughters, but what we observe in the 
SSM dataset is information concerning the sibling composition and family 
background of the respondent, and whether the respondent advanced to university or 
not.  The intuition behind the theoretical framework outlined previously can still be 
applied for our analysis, but the interpretation is now based from the perspective of 
the individual and not of the parent.  Instead of sons and daughters, we are now 
interested in brothers and sisters, and how the gender composition of siblings affect 
the individual’s probability of university advancement.  To avoid complications, I 
retain the same variables s and d to denote brothers and sisters, respectively. 
  Given the utility equation (1), parents may maximize their utility by 
choosing both quantity and quality of children simultaneously, in which case s, d, qs 
and qd are endogenous.  However, we assume here that this choice is sequential, 
where parents first choose the number of children, then allocate resources 
conditional on this decision, such that s and d are viewed as exogenous variables. 
  Father’s occupational prestige and city size are used here to control for 
social origin or the socio-economic status (SES) of the family which may influence 
individuals’ likelihood of advancing to university.
14  City size of residence at time of 
graduation from middle school (hereafter city size) is used to control for urban/rural 
differences.  City size is coded using the three-digit categorization defined by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs.  The three-digit codes are collapsed into three categories 
of city size in ascending order of population:  (1) towns and villages, (2) large cities, 
and (3) designated large metropolitan areas.  Cohort dummies are used to control for 14 
 
the nonlinear effects of university advancement over different cohorts of individuals.  




Because the SSM survey does not provide information concerning the 
gender composition of siblings, s and d are derived as close approximations given 
information on birth order and the birth order among siblings of the same gender.  
The estimation procedures are described in the Appendix.
15 
  Since the number of siblings (n) is the sum of brothers (s) and sisters (d), i.e. 
n = s + d, we cannot include n, s and d in the same estimation equation.  We can, 
however, estimate a model which includes s and d (but not n) since s and d are 
‘technically independent’ of each other and nested in n.  The null hypothesis 
condition (MRSs,d = 1) can be tested by examining whether the coefficients for s and 
d significantly differ from each other. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
  We begin our analysis by examining the general relationship between 
sibship size, social origin, and advancement to university.  Table III reports the 
results of the logit analysis predicting university advancement.  We confirm that a 
larger number of siblings reduces the probability of advancing to university, women 
were significantly less likely to advance to university than men, and that individuals 15 
 
from higher SES families were more likely to advance to university.  Older persons 
were less likely to advance to university than younger persons.  This pattern is 
consistent with the expansion in university advancement rates over time (Figure I).  
Although not shown here, I conducted a separate analysis which includes 
interactions with sibship size and cohort.  The results were not significant, 




  We next examine the extent to which gender interacts with the other 
variables in the analysis.  The second column shows the main effect – in this case 
men – while the third column reports the interaction effects with gender.  The 
interaction effects therefore answers the question:  Are the effects for men 
significantly different for women?  The results show that the gender interaction 
effects are weak for all variables:  Sibship size and social origin affect university 
advancement to a similar degree for both men and women.  The lack of significance 
among the cohort variables also suggests that the gender gap in university 
advancement rates have not changed over time. 
  Table IV reports the results of the logit analysis examining the effects of 
sibling composition on university advancement.  The results show strong evidence 
that family resources are allocated away from daughters toward sons.  For men (the 
main effects reported in the first column), the effects of an additional brother and an 
additional sister are both negative and significant, but the χ
2 comparison of the 16 
 
coefficients suggests that the two effects are not significantly different from each 
other (p = .637).  Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the MRS 




  The second column reports the interaction effects with gender.  For women, 
the effect of an additional brother is significant and negative in comparison to men, 
but the effect of an additional sister is not.  This relationship suggests that the 
negative effect of an additional brother on university advancement is more 
pronounced among women.  The χ
2 test of the null hypothesis reveals a p-value of 
.022, thereby supporting the position that the MRS between additional brothers and 
sisters for women is greater than unity. 
  In sum, larger number of siblings reduces the chances of university 
advancement for both men and women.  However, in the case of women, it is not the 
number of siblings per se that reduces her chances of advancement, but the number 
of brothers that strongly determines her fate.  My findings suggest that intra-
household resources are likely to be allocated in favor of sons and away from 
daughters.  From a woman’s perspective, an additional brother reduces her chances 
of advancing to university because the household resources are “drained away” from 
her in favor of supporting her brother’s education.   
 17 
 
5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In Japan, men and women advance to high school in equal numbers but a 
significantly lower proportion of women advance to university.  This gender gap 
reflects the inequality in the labor market where the demand for female university 
graduates has been persistently lower than their male counterparts.  Women in the 
Japanese labor force are typically placed into the external labor market which 
requires little skill and provides minimal training.  Employers seek high school or 
junior-college graduates for these positions instead of university graduates who 
require higher salaries.  Furthermore, women with university degrees may threaten 
the status quo of the Japanese patriarchy, where men seek women with lower 
educational credentials than themselves.  Given these constraints, it is not surprising 
that women hold lower educational aspirations, not only for themselves but for their 
daughters. 
The analytical section of this paper has examined the ways in which 
parents’ differential preferences for sons and daughters lead to the gender gap in 
university advancement.  The null hypothesis is the condition that sons and 
daughters are perfectly substitutable (MRSs,d = 1), a condition which posits that 
parents invest equally in their children’s education regardless of their gender.  I first 
find that sibship size has a negative impact on university advancement but that this 
effect is not significantly different between men and women.  However, we find that 
for women, it is not sibship size per se that reduces their chances of advancing to 
university, but the number of additional brothers, thereby rejecting the null 18 
 
hypothesis condition.  This finding supports the position that intra-household 
resources are allocated in favor of sons and away from daughters.   The findings also 
suggest that a model which accounts only for sibship size can explain only half the 
truth, because the gender composition of siblings plays a crucial role in determining 
university advancement for women. 
  Not surprisingly, the gender gap in earnings in the Japanese labor market 
remains pronounced.  According to the Ministry of Labor statistics (2000), female 
university graduates on average earned 32 percent less than their male counterparts.  
The unfavorable reward structure affects the incentives to pursue university 
education of not only the women themselves, but also the parents who sponsor their 
education. 
The future prospects for women’s employment are far from promising.  
Japan is headed towards becoming the fastest aging society in the world and the 
burden of taking care of the elderly will inevitably fall on the women (Osawa, 1990).  
The additional constraint imposed by the aging society will make it even more 
difficult for women to upgrade their educational aspirations. 
The recurring dynamic between supply and demand forces entraps Japanese 
women into a vicious cycle which results in downgrading educational aspirations, 
both for themselves and for their daughters (Figure III).  In order for parents to 
invest equally in their sons and daughters, the payoffs from educational investments 
must also be equalized.   
A breakthrough in this perpetuating cycle must be achieved through 19 
 
improvements on the demand-side, specifically by improving the reward structure 
and the working environment for women through both private and public initiatives.   
The 2001 White Paper on Women’s Labor issued by the Ministry of Health, 
Labor and Welfare reports that the labor force participation of women in the age 
group of 25 to 34 has increased compared to ten years ago.  However, the White 
Paper also reports that one out of four women who are currently not working want to 
work if circumstances allowed them to work and take care of their family at the 
same time.  This proportion of latent workers is not negligible.  Their inability to 
participate in the labor force constitutes a sizable loss to macroeconomic 
performance (Ono and Rebick, forthcoming). 
Policy measures must be targeted to enable women to balance work and 
family responsibilities.  Better access to childcare facilities, for example, has a larger 
impact on job continuity for married women than improvements in wages and 
working hours (Nakamura and Ueda, 1999).  Family-friendly policies, where 
employers provide flexible work arrangements accommodate their workers’ family 
responsibilities into the employment schedule, remain few among Japanese 
corporations but are increasing.  Such measures will align the incentives for women 
to pursue university education, and for the parents to invest more in their daughters. 
  In the past, government policies intended to foster the equal employment of 
women have fallen short of the mark.  The impact of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law (EEOL) enacted in 1985 has been cosmetic at best.
16  Employers 
effectively maneuver the EEOL to their advantage, and the proportion of women 20 
 
hired into the internal labor market has changed little since its enactment.  More 
aggressive and systematic policy action is required to ensure a secure standing for 
Japanese women both in the family and at work. 
 
Directions for Further Research:  The International Context 
The model proposed in this paper is built on the theoretical intuitions of the 
economics of the family literature.  In Table I, the “Sons/Daughters Ratio” reported 
in the third column can now be interpreted as the marginal rates of substitution 
between sons and daughters (holding quality constant).  If the predictions of the 
model are valid, then the international comparisons data reported in Table I would 
lead us to predict that the MRS between sons and daughters in countries other than 
Japan is not significantly different from unity, and therefore that the gender 
composition of siblings should not affect the individual’s probability of university 
advancement. 
  As a preliminary analysis, I investigated the relationship between the 
difference in university aspirations for sons versus daughters, and the difference in 
the university advancement rate for men versus women for the countries listed in 
Table I.  The results are reported in Table V.  Data in the first column in Table V are 





The “gender gap” data in the second column should be interpreted as:  for every 
woman that advances to university, how many men advance?  In the case of Japan, 
this ratio is close to 2; in the case of the United States, Sweden and Philippines, this 
ratio is less than one, indicating that a larger number of women advance to 
university than men. 
  Figure IV shows the plotted results of Table V.  The diagonal line is not a 
45 degree line, but a trend line.  In general, Figure IV shows that the gender gap in 
the university advancement rate roughly corresponds to the difference in parental 
aspirations for sons and daughters.  Viewed in this way, we can see that the gender 
gap (in the university advancement rate) in Japan is no longer an outlier, as it is 
fairly consistent with the difference in parent’s university aspirations for sons versus 
daughters.  In fact, the other countries conform well to the trend line, albeit some 
deviation for Korea.  These preliminary results suggest that parents’ educational 
aspirations are reasonable predictors of gender inequality in higher education.  An 
international comparison to examine in more detail the applicability of the proposed 






Estimating the number of brothers and sisters 
  The SSM survey provides the following information concerning siblings and birth order: 
 
 n :  number of siblings (including self) 
 r :  birth order 
 a :  birth order among siblings of same gender 
 
where n ≥ r ≥ a.  This information enables us to closely approximate the number of respondent’s 
brothers (s) and sisters (d). 
  Suppose we have a male respondent who has 4 siblings (n = 4, including himself), was the 
second child to be born (r = 2), and was the first to be born among his brothers (a = 1), and we want 




Birth order (r) Sisters   
  1 2 3 4   
1  f m  m  m  =1+0=1 
2  f m  m f  =1+1=2 
3  f m f m  =1+1=2 
4  f m f  f  =1+2=3 
       
       
  A B   
 
Figure A.1  The relationship between sibship size and birth order 
 
In Figure A.1, part A is the determined component.  If he was born second in line and was the first to 
be born among his brothers, this means that the first born (r = 1) had to be a sister.  Part B is the 
random component.  In this case, the four possible outcomes of the third and fourth child are:  brother 
brother (m, m), brother sister (m, f), sister brother (f, m), or sister sister (f, f).  Number of sisters (d) 
summed over the four possible outcomes (C) is eight, so the average number of sisters per outcome is 
two.  The generalized equation for this estimation is: 
  
  Average number of sisters = 
C
B A
g a r n
+
= , ,   
 
where g is the estimate of the average number of the respondent’s siblings of the opposite sex.  The 
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The total number of sisters from the determined component (A) is: 
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  It can easily be shown that the above equation applies to all possible cases.  For example, 
the simple case where r = n necessarily implies that the random component is zero and the equation 
reduces to d = r – a.  Likewise, r = a implies that the deterministic component is zero and the 
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1 In the current study, university refers to four-year universities and excludes two-year junior colleges. 
2 Recent data suggests that this proportion was approximately 73 percent in 1992 (Ministry of 
Education, 1995). 
3 Tuition among Japanese universities has historically been less expensive in comparison to the 
United States, but this gap is narrowing.  In 1995, tuition was 497,000 yen among national 
universities and 1,100,000 yen among private universities in Japan (Ministry of Education, 1997). 
4 This does not imply that women earn higher than men, but that their rate of return from university 
education is higher.  In fact, on average female university graduates in Japan earned 32 percent less 
than their male counterparts in 1999 (Ministry of Labor 2000).  This pattern is also observed in other 
OECD countries, and not necessarily unique to Japan. 
5 In the past, advocates of the ‘good wife, wise mother’ ethos have suggested that “learning is 
unnecessary for women” and that women should be taught “how to create a happy life” (Kikuchi, 
1940, cited in Smith, 1989). 
6 The Economic Planning Agency reports these figures to be 62.2 percent for sons and 26.5 percent 
for daughters in 1995.  LeTendre (1996) reports similar results among the parents of Japanese middle 
school students in his study.  Although these data are more recent, I use the 1988 data in the interest 
of international comparison. 
7 We may impose the constraint such that α + β = 1 in which case α and β can be interpreted as the 
fraction of total household income allocated for sons and daughters respectively, but this is not a 
necessary condition for our present purpose. 
8 For similar argument, see Davies and Zhang (1995) who explain, “for simplicity, boys and girls are 
assumed to be born in fixed, equal proportions, so that all families have an equal number of sons and 
daughters.” (1995, p.798). 
9 Equation (2) is a transformation of the following budget constraint proposed by Becker (1993) and 
Becker and Lewis (1973):  I = pc qn + πzZ, where pc is the unit price of quality (q), n is the number of 
children and πz is the shadow price of parent’s consumption. 
10 We derive the marginal utility conditions with respect to quality since we assume that the number 
of sons and daughters are exogenously determined. 
11 Since qs = α/(λs), qd = β/(λd) and α +β + γ = λ(qss + qdd + pzZ) = λI.  By substituting λ = (α +β + γ)/I 
into the demand functions, we obtain equations (4a) and (4b). 
12 The model described here is a simple case where the resources to be allocated for sons and 
daughters are independent of parent’s own consumption (Z).  If parents’ consumption varies 27 
 
                                                                                                                                         




γ.  MRSqs,qd and MRSs,d are identical to equations (5a) and (5b) because U’ is a monotonic 
transformation of equation (1).  The MRS between s and Z, and d and Z are MRSs,Z = qs/pz and MRSd,Z 
= qd/pz, respectively.  These conditions suggest that MRSs,Z = MRSd,Z if qs = qd, but MRSs,Z > MRSd,Z if 
qs > qd:  If parents invest more in their sons than for their daughters, then they must forego their own 
consumption more. 
13 I am grateful to Mary Brinton and the SSM Committee for granting me permission to use the 1995 
SSM data. 
14 Theoretically, it is desirable to control for parents’ education – mother’s education, father’s 
education, or the average of the two – in order to examine the intergenerational effects of educational 
attainment.  However, mother’s education and father’s education are highly correlated, and the two 
are also highly correlated with the respondent’s age (or cohort) causing multicollinearity.  Father’s 
occupational prestige is used here following Naoi (1994) and Okamoto and Hara (1994).  I am 
grateful to Takehiko Kariya for allowing me access to the SSM occupational prestige scores. 
15 Parents’ preferential treatment may also include the birth order of their children, e.g. the eldest son 
may be favored over other children.  However, we do not examine birth order effects in the current 
analysis because we do not have information concerning birth order and gender for all siblings.  
16 See for example Hanami (2000) who refers to the EEOL as a ‘lame duck’ legislation.  Edwards 
(1988) argues that the lifetime employment system and the labor supply patterns of women make it 
unlikely that the EEOL will improve the socio-economic position of women.  Osawa (1993) explains 





Table I  Mothers’ aspirations for university education (percent) 
 Sons  Daughters  Sons/Daughters  ratio 
Japan 73.0  27.7  2.6 
United States  68.9  65.8  1.1 
Sweden 31.1  30.8 1.0 
Germany 19.6  14.3  1.4 
England 48.1  44.1 1.1 
Korea 88.3  81.2  1.1 
Philippines 87.3  84.5  1.0 
[SOURCE:  Office of the Prime Minister 1982, reprinted from Brinton (1988).  Data 
for Korea was taken from the Korea Survey (Gallup) Polls Limited, 1987.  The Gallup 
organization in Korea replicated the survey for a comparable sample of married 






Table II  Means and standard deviations of variables used for estimations 
Variable Description  Mean  S.D. 
Advancement to 
university 
Coded 1 if individual advanced to 
university and zero if s/he did not 
        0.16              0.37     
      
Father’s occupational 
prestige 
Coded according to occupational prestige 
scores developed by Naoi (1994) and 
Okamoto and Hara (1994). 
      51.22              9.51     
      
City size  City size at time of graduation from 
mandatory education categorized according 
to Ministry of Home Affairs classification: 
1=towns and villages, 2=large cities, 
3=designated large metropolitan areas  
        1.84              0.68     
      
Sex  Coded:  0 = men, 1 = women          0.52              0.50     
      
Sibship size  Number of siblings          3.96              1.88     
      
Additional brother  Number of additional brothers          1.50              1.16     
      
Additional sister  Number of additional sisters          1.46              1.13     
      
Cohort 30s  Coded 1 if age is between 30 and 39 and 
zero if not 
        0.18              0.38     
      
Cohort 40s  Coded 1 if age is between 40 and 49 and 
zero if not 
        0.26              0.44     
     
Cohort 50s  Coded 1 if age is between 50 and 59 and 
zero if not 
        0.22              0.42     
     
Cohort 60s  Coded 1 if age is between 60 and 69 and 
zero if not 






  Table III  Logit coefficients describing the effect of sibship size on university entry 
         Main effect  Interaction effect 
with gender 
 Coef    S.E.   Coef    S.E. Coef    S.E. 
Sibship size  -0.280 *** (0.056)  -0.240 *** (0.063) -0.207   (0.149)
           
Father’s occ prestige  0.079 *** (0.007)  0.078 *** (0.008) 0.005   (0.014)
           
City size  0.515 *** (0.101)  0.567 *** (0.121) -0.182   (0.222)
           
Sex -1.895  *** (0.153)       
           
Cohort 30s  0.316   (0.199)  0.389   (0.255) -0.221   (0.403)
           
Cohort 40s  -0.378 *  (0.204)  -0.323   (0.247) -0.108   (0.435)
           
Cohort 50s  -0.931 *** (0.254)  -0.762 **  (0.297) -0.616   (0.613)
           
Cohort 60s  -1.156 *** (0.275)  -1.043 *** (0.314) -0.562   (0.753)
           
Constant -4.744  *** (0.437)  -5.010 *** (0.548) -0.989   (0.964)
         
χ
2  543.74   550.22     





Table IV  Logit coefficients describing the effect of sibling composition on university entry 
  Main effect    Interaction effect with gender 
 Coef    S.E.  Coef    S.E. 
Additional brother  -0.218 **  (0.089)  -0.492 **  (0.229)
             
Additional sister  -0.264 ***  (0.094)  0.032   (0.201)
             
Father’s occ prestige  0.078 ***  (0.008)  0.006   (0.014)
             
City size  0.567 ***  (0.121)  -0.172   (0.222)
             
Cohort 30s  0.385   (0.255)  -0.246   (0.404)
             
Cohort 40s  -0.323   (0.247)  -0.139   (0.436)
             
Cohort 50s  -0.768 **  (0.298)  -0.631   (0.612)
             
Cohort 60s  -1.045 ***  (0.314)  -0.538   (0.750)
             
Constant -5.244 ***  (0.532)  -1.231   (0.918)
     
χ
2  553.30    






Table V  Gender gap in university advancement rate as a 
function of parent’s university aspirations (selected 
countries) 
 
 Parent’s  university 
aspirations 
(Sons versus daughters) 
Gender gap in university 
advancement rate 
(Men versus women) 
Japan 2.6  1.9 
U.S. 1.0  0.9 
Sweden 1.0  0.9 
Germany 1.4  1.5 
England 1.1  1.2 
Philippines 1.0  0.8 
Korea 1.1  2.1 
[SOURCE:  “Parent’s university aspirations” taken from Table I, 
third column.  University advancement rate data taken from 1997 























[SOURCE:  Ministry of Education 2001] 















[SOURCE:  Recruit Research 1998] 
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Figure IV  Gender gap in university advancement rate as a function 
of parent’s university aspirations (selected countries) 
 
 